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ABSTRACT
The Bill of Rights, The Framers, and the Ninth
Amendment is an examination of current arguments for and
against expanded recognition of the Ninth Amendment and
unenumerated rights by the judiciary.
the Ninth Amendment is included.

A brief history of

Also explored are the

debates between the Federalists and Anti-Federalists on the
need for a bill of rights, and how the Ninth Amendment could
resolve this conflict.
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CHAPTER 1

THE FEDERALISTS AND ANTI-FEDERALISTS

Introduction
Over two hundred years after the adoption of the
Constitution of the United States, the necessity, or even
usefulness of the Bill of Rights appears to be a settled
question.

Debate currently centers on the particulars:

the

refining of exactly what each guarantee provided in the
first ten amendments to the Constitution really means.

The

need for or desirability of a bill of rights in the first
place is today an uncontested issue; yet the dispute was not
so uniformly decided when the Constitution was crafted and
set before the citizenry for ratification in the late 1780s.

The Debate Over a Bill of Rights
When the 1787 Convention convened and the proposed
Constitution was turned over to the states for ratification,
the lack of a bill of rights became the major point of
dissatisfaction with the people (Van Loan III 1989).

As

Irving Brant noted, "No sooner had the Continental Congress
laid the proposed Constitution before the people for
1

ratification than a great cry went up:
of rights" (Storing 1985, 15).

it contained no bill

Public opinion was firmly in

favor of a bill of rights (Rutland 1985, 2).

In defense of

the Constitution without a bill of rights, the Federalists
argued that a bill of rights would be unnecessary.

The

proposed government would have the power to act only in the
areas in which it had expressly delegated powers (Levy 1987,
266).

As James Wilson said, "everything which is not given,

is reserved" to the people or the states (Levy 1987, 266).
The second argument the Federalists employed was that a bill
of rights would not only be unnecessary, but dangerous
(Rossiter 1961, 513).

James Wilson, among others, believed

that listing rights would imply government power over any
unlisted rights (Levy 1987, 267).

Wilson argued,

If we attempt an enumeration [of rights], every
thing that is not enumerated is presumed to be
given. The consequence is that an imperfect
enumeration would throw all implied power into the
scale of the government, and the rights of the
people would be rendered incomplete (Cooper 1991,
423) .
But as Randy Barnett wrote in his article "A Ninth Amendment
for Today's Constitution," the Anti-Federalists effectively
turned this argument against the Federalists, observing that
there were several rights listed in the body of the
Constitution, such as a prohibition on ex post facto laws or
bills of attainder, yet other rights considered fundamental
were not listed (Barnett 1993, 178).

The Anti-Federalists,

on the other hand, believed the Constitution should not be
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ratified since it left so many basic rights unprotected.
The Anti-Federalist argument was ultimately persuasive to
the people, thus the Federalists conceded the point, and
promised that a bill of rights would be proposed after
ratification of the Constitution (Barnett 1993, 178).
Of course, the Constitution was ratified, but the
intended bill of rights was not immediately forthcoming.
James Madison repeatedly attempted to put the matter before
the House of Representatives, but it was often swept aside
in favor of discussing a tax bill or other matters.
Eventually, Madison got a Select Committee of the House to
consider proposed amendments to the Constitution.

Ten of

these were eventually modified and adopted as the Bill of
Rights (Barnett 1993).1

Who Was Right?
In retrospect it appears that the Anti-Federalists were
correct when they reasoned that a bill of rights was
necessary to ensure the rights of the people; the fact that
it was ever a question at all is something of a historical
footnote.

Yet the arguments on both sides are still

compelling and may offer insight as to how the Bill of

10ne of these proposed amendments was finally ratified on
May 7, 1992, as the Twenty-seventh amendment to the Constitution.
It reads, "No law, varying the compensation for the services of
the Senators and Representatives shall take effect, until an
election of representatives shall have intervened" (DeBenedictis
1992) .

Rights can best be utilized currently.

The Bill of Rights

itself contains the tool necessary to quell the fears and
provide the advantages of both sides of the debate two
centuries ago.

That device is the Ninth Amendment.

The

Ninth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution reads, "The
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people" (U.S. Constitution, Amendment IX).

Hidden within

this often ignored clause is the key to reconciling the
Federalist and Anti-Federalist positions, for it can serve
each of these masters ably, if only given the power
and recognition to do so.
In order to make the potential role of the Ninth
Amendment clear, I will analyze the arguments of the
Federalists and the Anti-Federalists, and the debate
concerning the need for a bill of rights.

By examining

arguments from both sides, I will show that the Ninth
Amendment can help to resolve the difficulties pointed out
by either position.

The history of the Ninth Amendment is

also explored, along with contemporary debates about the
problems associated with determining the meaning and
applicability of the Ninth Amendment, as well as the
conflict over judicial review.

Finally, I argue that the

Ninth Amendment can effectively secure unenumerated rights
through the interpretive theory of the presumption of
liberty.

5

The Federalists
The Federalists attempted to defend the proposed
Constitution absent a bill of rights with several arguments
First they claimed that a bill of rights under the new
system would be unnecessary, second that words were not
capable of protecting rights completely, and finally that a
bill of rights would be dangerous.

A Bill of Rights is Unnecessary
The Federalists initially argued that the Constitution
needed no bill of rights because it would be a government
that would be concerned with "general interests of the
nation," not the private rights of individual citizens
(Rossiter 1961, 513).

The proposed government was one of

limited powers that could act only in proscribed areas.

As

James Wilson argued, the government is one of specific
enumerated powers, unlike the state governments whose broad
grants of power made bills of rights desirable (Storing
1985, 23).

A limited government constrained by its

enumerated powers is not in need of a bill of rights to
protect citizens' private rights.

This argument is weak

considering that governments, and according to Madison and
others, the legislatures in particular, were known to
attempt to assume and amass powers well beyond any
proscribed limits.

Considering post-adoption judicial

decisions such as McCulloch v. Maryland (17 U.S. 316),
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governmental powers have grown to be near limitless,
especially as to implied powers.

For example, the Commerce

Clause has been interpreted to allow legislation on anything
from civil rights, kidnapping, and pollution, to wages and
prices throughout the several states (Rossum and Tarr 1991,
230-1).

The Limiting Nature of
Lists and Language

The Federalists also argued that an incomplete list of
rights could imply governmental power over any rights not
listed.

They coupled this with the argument that language

and practicality make enumerating every right of human
beings impossible.

As Justice James Iredell said, "it would

be impossible to enumerate every one.

Let any one make what

collection or enumeration of rights he pleases, I will
immediately mention twenty or thirty rights not contained in
it" (Barnett 1993, 2:7).
all the rights of men?

And James Wilson noted, "Enumerate
I am sure, sir, that no gentleman in

the late Convention would have attempted such a thing" (Shaw
1990, 52).

He also argued that "an omission in the

enumeration of the powers of the government is neither so
dangerous nor important as an omission in the enumeration of
the rights of the people" (Cooper 1991, 423).

Alexander

Hamilton not only recognized the futility of trying to list
all rights, but indicated that language itself was imperfect
to the task when he wrote, "But no language is so copious as
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to supply words and phrases for every complex idea, or so
correct as not to include many equivocally denoting
different ideas" (Rossiter 1961, 229). And "What is the
liberty of the press?

Who can give it any definition which

would not leave the utmost latitude for evasion?" (Rossiter
1961, 524).

This is persuasive reasoning by the

Federalists, for as Thomas Hobbes wrote in the Leviathan,
. . . there is no Commonwealth in the world
wherein there be rules enough set down for the
regulating of all the actions and words of men (as
being a thing impossible): it followeth
necessarily that in all kinds of actions, by the
laws pretermitted, men have the liberty of doing
what their own reasons shall suggest for the most
profitable to themselves (Olafson 1961, 104).
The Constitution, not just the Bill of Rights, uses broad,
vague language, such as the necessary and proper clause, to
allow adaptation, and to avoid the limiting nature of more
precise words.

A Bill of Rights is Dangerous

The Federalists bolstered these arguments with the
claim that a bill of rights could be dangerous.

Alexander

Hamilton wrote of the treacherous nature of a bill of
rights:
They would contain various exceptions to powers
which are not granted; and, on this very account,
would afford a colorable pretext to claim more
than were granted. For why declare that things
shall not be done which there is no power to do?
Why, for instance, should it be said that the
liberty of the press shall not be restrained, when
no power is given by which restrictions may be
imposed? (Rossiter 1961, 513-4).
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James Wilson concurred, stating that,
In a government possessed of enumerated powers,
such a measure would be not only unnecessary, but
preposterous and dangerous. Whence comes this
notion, that in the United States there is no
security without a bill of rights? Have the
citizens of South Carolina no security for their
liberties? They have no bill of rights . . . .
The state of New Jersey has no bill of rights.
The state of New York has not [sic) bill of rights
. . . . In all societies, there are many powers
and rights which cannot be particularly
enumerated. A bill of rights annexed to a
constitution is an enumeration of the powers
reserved. If we attempt an enumeration, every
thing that is not enumerated is presumed to be
given (Shaw 1990, 46).
As Justice James Iredell said at the time,
[I]t would not only be useless, but dangerous, to
enumerate a number of rights which are not
intended to be given up; because it would be
implying, in the strongest manner, that every
right not included in the exception might be
impaired by government without usurpation (Barnett
1993, 2:7).
James Madison, in a letter penned in 1788 to Thomas
Jefferson, wrote that he viewed a bill of rights as
unimportant,
because experience proves the inefficacy of a bill
of rights on those occasions when its controul
[sic] is most needed. Repeated violations of these
parchment barriers have been committed by
overbearing majorities in every State (Mason and
Baker 1985, 287).
In the same missive, Madison argued that essential rights,
and "the rights of conscience in particular, if submitted to
public definition would be narrowed much more than they are
likely ever to be by an assumed power" (Mason and Baker
1985, 287) .

10
James Wilson, in a speech advocating the adoption of
the Constitution in 1787 paired the two Federalist arguments
against a bill of rights when he stated,
In truth, then, the proposed system possesses no
influence whatever upon the press, and it would
have been merely nugatory to have introduced a
formal declaration upon the subject - nay, that
very declaration might have been construed to
imply that some degree of power was given, since
we undertook to define its extent (Ketcham 1986,
184-5).
As Madison himself stated when he presented the Ninth
Amendment for ratification, this was the most persuasive
argument against adoption of a bill of rights.

The listing

of certain rights, to the exclusion of others, can imply
that those enumerated are the only rights protected.
Madison hoped to solve this problem with the addition of the
Ninth Amendment.

The Anti-Federalists
The Anti-Federalists, on the other hand, argued that
the want of a bill of rights was grounds for rejecting the
proposed constitution.

Jefferson, in a letter to James

Madison in 1787, wrote that "a bill of rights is what the
people are entitled to against every government on earth,
general or particular, and what no just government should
refuse, or rest on inference" (Peterson 1975, 285).

11
A Legal Check

The Anti-Federalists furnished several arguments as to
why a bill of rights was essential.

First, a bill of rights

provides the judiciary a legal check on the other branches.
In a letter to Madison dated March 15, 1787, Jefferson
wrote, "In the arguments in favor of a declaration of
rights, you omit one which has great weight with me, the
legal check which it puts into the hands of the judiciary"
(Peterson 1975, 438).

Alluding to judicial review,

Jefferson urged Madison to recognize that the people will
have recourse to challenge abuses of their rights by
appealing to the courts, and citing the Bill of Rights for
their legal claims for relief.

Educating the People

A bill of rights could provide people with information
and the idea and sentiment that they have these rights.
Knowing these rights, the people would want them protected,
and take their causes to court (Barnett 1989, 23) .

Changing

from his original view of a bill of rights as dangerous,
Madison urged that a bill of rights would give the people
something to point to, to educate them, and to "impress some
degree of respect for them, to establish public opinion in
their favor, and rouse the attention of the whole community"
(Barnett 1989, 58).

Again, in a letter to Jefferson,

Madison sustained that,
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The political truths declared in that solemn
manner acquire by degrees the character of
fundamental maxims of free Governments, and as
they become incorporated with the national
sentiment, counteract the impulses of interest and
passion (Mason and Baker 1985, 288).
As Edmund Randolph stated, "a perpetual standard should be
erected around which the people might rally, and by a
notorious record be forever admonished to be watchful, firm,
and virtuous" (Storing 1985, 31).

A Written Document

A bill of rights, like a written constitution, becomes
a uniform, written document to which all may appeal, and
which endures through time.

The Pennsylvania Minority's2

first objection to the Constitution was its lack of a bill
of rights (Ketcham 1986, 247).

A bill of rights, laying

down firmly the rights of human beings, and supporting the
states' bills of rights, was an unacceptable omission for
these dissenting members of the Pennsylvania Convention
(Ketcham 1986, 247).

Anti-Federalist John Dewitt, in his

essay of October 27, 1787, also complained of the want of a
bill of rights (Ketcham 1986, 195).

He argued that a

society can never be too explicit in their terms when
forfeiting rights to the government, or the liberties of the

2"After the Pennsylvania Convention ratified the new
constitution on December 12, 1787, by a vote of 46 to 23, twentyone members of the minority signed a dissenting address that
appeared in the Pennsylvania Packet and Daily Advertiser on
December 18, 1787" (Ketcham 1986, 237).

13
people are likely to be trampled upon.

"The line," he

wrote, "cannot be drawn with too much precision and
accuracy" (Ketcham 1986, 195).

Governmental abuse over the

rights of citizens is what led to the first bill of rights
being adopted, Dewitt reasoned, and the principle should not
be forgotten.

Citizens must be careful and specific to make

clear what powers are granted, implied, or reserved to the
people (Ketcham 1986, 196).

Jefferson, in a letter to

Madison dated March 15, 1789, agreed when he wrote, "The
declaration of rights will be the text whereby [states] will
try all the acts of the federal government" (Peterson 1975,
439) .

A Protection Against Future Abuses

The written character of the Constitution and the Bill
of Rights also lends itself as a protection against future
abuses.

John Dewitt, in an essay written in 1787, argued

that a bill of rights is an important guard against future
tyranny.

He stated that while the people who originally

formed the new government may understand that they have
retained certain rights, they should attempt to deter any
future claims by tyrants that rights were surrendered by
"tacit implication" since they were not set aside and
protected (Ketcham 1986, 197).

Silence by the people on

certain vital points may invite claims to dominion and the
surrender of the rights of the people.
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A Rebuttal to the Federalists

Thomas Jefferson attempted to counter Federalist
arguments that by listing a few rights, you may omit others.
As he wrote to James Madison in 1789, "Half a loaf is better
than no bread.

If we cannot secure all our rights, let us

secure what we can" (Mason and Baker 1985, 289).

Jefferson

continued by noting that,
The inconveniences of the Declaration [of rights]
are that it may cramp government in its useful
exertions. But the evil of this is shortlived,
moderate, and reparable. The inconveniences of
the want of a Declaration are permanent,
afflicting and irreparable: they are in constant
progression from bad to worse (Mason and Baker
1985, 290).
Even if all of the rights of human beings cannot be secured,
protection of a few rights is preferable to not having a
shield for any rights.

CHAPTER 2

BOTH SIDES REEXAMINED

Both sides of the debate make valid arguments, so who
was right?

Public opinion, time, and history seem to have

validated the Anti-Federalist position.
has worked.
protected it.

The Bill of Rights

The people have embraced it and the courts have
The cases in which citizens have claimed

their rights have been infringed, and have appealed to the
first ten amendments is legion, especially with the
extension of these prohibitions to the state governments via
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Anti-Federalist Victories

As the Anti-Federalists hoped, the Bill of Rights can
be a check on the other branches of the government in
advance of the passage of an oppressive measure.

Alexander

Hamilton, though an opponent to a bill of rights, recognized
the power of judicial review in Federalist 78:
It not only serves to moderate the immediate
mischiefs of those which may have been passed but
it operates as a check upon the legislative body
in passing them; who, perceiving that obstacles to
the success of an iniquitous intention are to be
expected from the scruples of the courts, are in a
15

16
manner compelled, by the very motives of the
injustice they meditate, to qualify their
attempts (Rossiter 1961, 470).
Madison was also quite prophetic in his speech before the
House when he stated,
. . . independent tribunals of justice will
consider themselves in a peculiar manner the
guardians of those rights; they will be an
impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of
power in the legislative or executive; they will
be naturally led to resist every encroachment upon
rights expressly stipulated for in the
constitution by the declaration of rights (Barnett
1989, 60-1).
Claims for free speech, free press, free religion, search
and seizure protection, and virtually all the other
guarantees have found their way to the courts, and the
judiciary has utilized the Bill of Rights to protect the
liberties of the citizenry.

The Bill of Rights has thus

provided the judicial check, the explicit text to which to
appeal, and has educated the people and roused their
support.

Fears of the Federalists Realized
Unfortunately, that is only half the story.

The

Federalists' prediction of the loss of unlisted rights has
come to pass.

Supreme Court justices, as well as legal and

political theorists, have declared that there are no rights
beyond those specifically listed in the Bill of Rights.

For

example, in Griswold v. Connecticut (381 U.S. 479), Justice
Hugo Black's dissenting opinion rested on the claim that the
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law challenged in this case was " . . .

not forbidden by any

provision of the Federal Constitution as that Constitution
is written . . . "

(Griswold 527).

In the same case, in

which he also dissented, Justice Potter Stewart restated all
of

theamendments to which the majority referred in the

decision

and declared that not only did the Connecticut law

not violate any of these, but that the Ninth Amendment is
nothing more than a constitutional truism, even narrowing it
to nothing more than a restatement of the Tenth Amendment.
In the course of its opinion the Court refers to
no less than six Amendments to the Constitution:
the First, the Third, the Fourth, the Fifth, the
Ninth, and the Fourteenth. But the Court does not
say which of these Amendments, if any, it thinks
is infringed by this Connecticut law . . .
(Griswold 527-8).
While the majority opinion supported the expansion of
individual rights, the opinion has been severely criticized
as an illegitimate use of judicial power to create rights
out of thin air.

Doe v. Bolton (410 U.S. 179) provided

similar dissenting comments in regard to the "new" right of
privacy.

Justice Byron White in his dissent wrote that

there is nothing in the Constitution to support the right to
privacy.

As he commented, "The Court simply fashions and

announces a new Constitutional right . . . with scarcely any
reason or authority for its actions . . . "

(Doe 221-2).

In Bowers v. Hardwick (478 U.S. 186), the majority decided
that the Court should not expand clauses such as the Due
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Process Clause - and, we may assume, the Ninth Amendment to protect "new" rights.
Robert Bork, unsuccessful Supreme Court nominee, often
stated in his nomination hearings that if there is no
specific provision in the Constitution, the judge should not
act (Barnett 1993, 2:428).

He does not consider the Ninth

Amendment a specific provision.

As he stated, his concern

with rights such as the privacy right as fashioned by
Justice William 0. Douglas in Griswold is that it "simply
comes out of nowhere, that it does not have any rooting in
the Constitution, it is also that he does not give it any
contours, so you do not know what it is going to mean from
case to case" (Barnett 1993, 2:432).

Bork went on to state

that "What we are talking about here was a generalized,
undefined right of privacy which is not in the Bill of
Rights" (Barnett 1993, 2:434).

Bork denied that the Ninth

Amendment is a repository for rights, such as the privacy
right, claiming that to his knowledge, no one ever "knew
what the Ninth Amendment did mean and what it was intended
to do" (Barnett 1993, 2:433).

Political and legal

commentators have also denied the existence of unenumerated
rights.

Walter Berns, in his article "The Constitution as a

Bill of Rights," complained of "judicially created rights,"
and declared that the courts invent rights without any
regard to the text of the Constitution (Berns 1985, 67, 69).
Berns argues that there is no such thing as the right to
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self expression, or abortion, or to be a conscientious
objector.

Gary McDonnell, in his essay "The Politics of

Original Intention" wrote, "The Constitution does not speak
of a right to privacy; the Court simply created one"
(McDonnell 1989, 9).

L. B. Boudin, quoting Justice Black,

attempts to make this point:
In determining whether an act of the legislature
is constitutional or not, we must look to the body
of the Constitution itself for reasons. The
general principles of justice, liberty, and right,
not contained or expressed in that instrument are
no proper elements of a judicial decision upon it
(Boudin 1988, 134).
Theorists and Supreme Court justices (and a nominee)
demonstrate that the Federalist fears of a loss of unlisted
rights were well founded.

The Constitutionality of
Unenumerated Rights

Detractors of unenumerated rights fail to recognize
that there is supporting text in the Constitution for
unenumerated rights, and that is the Ninth Amendment.

They

also fail to see the innate danger hidden within their
argument.

If the rights specifically enumerated in the

first several amendments are the only rights Americans can
claim, all power is left to the government, consistent with
majority rule, only forbidding precisely what is in the Bill
of Rights (Dworkin 1992, 384).

If this is the case, then

the very people who decry these unenumerated rights may find
themselves on the other end of a majority which, as Justice
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Arthur Goldberg stated in his concurring opinion in
Griswold, could make laws mandating birth control.

After

all, there is no specific constitutional provision against
it.

At Robert Bork's confirmation hearings, Senator Edward

M. Kennedy pointed out to him that in Bork's system,
majorities would be able to do anything they please short of
violating enumerated rights.

This would allow nearly any

legislation, including compulsory abortion, if a legislative
majority so desired.

Kennedy stated that this is precisely

what the Bill of Rights was meant to guard against:

"There

are some things in America which no majority can do to the
minority or to the individuals" (Barnett 1993, 2:433).
Even the sweeping changes of time and society stymied
the emergence of newly recognized rights, or even expanded
views of enumerated rights, as the case of Olmstead v. U.S.
(48 S.Ct. 564) demonstrates.

In Olmstead, the Supreme Court

decided that wiretapping was not illegal because it did not
fit a strict interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.

The

majority held that there was not a search and not a seizure.
In his dissent, Justice Louis D. Brandeis argued that
wiretapping was something the framers couldn't have dreamed
of.

The founders had no conception of wiretapping, and

Brandeis cautioned that technology could allow government to
invade our rights in ways never imagined by the framers, or
anyone else.

Olmstead was subsequently overturned by Berger

v. New York (388 U.S. 41) and Katz v. U.S. (389 U.S. 342) in
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the 1960s.

In both cases, wiretapping and electronic

eavesdropping were considered violations of the
Constitution.

Justice William O. Douglas, in his concurring

opinion in Berger, breathed a sigh of relief:

"at long last

it [this case] overrules sub silentio Olmstead v. U.S."
(Berger 64).

Although it was finally overturned after forty

years, Olmstead illustrates the difficulty with which new
rights and protections are faced.
The benefit of the Anti-Federalists' wisdom has indeed
acquired Thomas Jefferson's "half a loaf."

But as the

Federalists feared, the Bill of Rights - so far - has
obtained only the half loaf.
get a "full loaf."

The quest now lies in how to

The task is easy, because the framers

have provided us the ingredients:

the Ninth Amendment.

Answering the Federalists
Within the Bill of Rights itself lies the answer to the
Federalists' objections.

The Federalists, as already noted,

did not want any bill of rights at all.

This means, of

course, that all rights under the Constitution would have
been unenumerated rights (Barnett 1989, 20) .

Surely it

cannot be debated that the framers would have denied
protection for rights such as free speech, press, or any of
the rights of conscience.

Had the authors and ratifiers of

the Bill of Rights known that the rights in those first ten
amendments would be considered the only rights of the
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people, they certainly would not have settled for so paltry
a list.

In fact, it is only common sense that a clause such

as the Ninth Amendment should be inserted into the
Constitution.

No text alone is so comprehensive that it can

cover everything (Grey 1993, 2:202).

Norman Redlich

commented on this point in "Are There 'Certain Rights . . .
Retained by the People'?"; words are inadequate to define
all the rights in a free society (Redlich, 1989, 1:145).

As

Congressman Theodore Sedgwick of Massachusetts argued at the
time of ratification, the Constitution need not "descend to
such minutiae" as specifying a right to peaceably assemble
(Cooper 1991, 424).

He stated that such an enumeration

would have entailed going "into a very lengthy enumeration
of rights; they might have declared that a man should have a
right to wear his hat if he pleased; that he might get up
when he pleased, and go to bed when he thought
proper . . . "

(Cooper 1991, 424-5).

Rights are limitless

because rights are whatever anyone can think of, so long as
they do not infringe on the rights of others.

Charles

Black, Jr., in his article "On Reading and Using the Ninth
Amendment," argued that vague wording in the Constitution is
a good thing, for by listing rights, we necessarily limit
them (Black, Jr. 1989).

Using the example of cruel and

unusual punishments, he remarked that if a few punishments
were prohibited, certainly equally cruel punishments could
be thought up.

Dworkin effectively illustrates why more
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precise language would be contrary to the purpose of the
Constitution.

As he argues in Taking Rights Seriously, the

Constitution lays down certain principles and concepts
concerning liberty and justice.

Dworkin compares these

concepts to instructions to his children.

He writes,

Suppose I tell my children simply that I expect
them not to treat others unfairly. I no doubt
have in mind examples of the conduct I mean to
discourage, but I would not accept that my
'meaning' was limited to these examples, for two
reasons. First I would expect my children to
apply my instructions to situations I had not and
could not have thought about. Second, I stand
ready to admit that some particular act I had
thought was fair when I spoke was in fact unfair,
or vice versa, if one of my children is able to
convince me of that later; in that case I should
want to say that my instructions covered the case
he cited, not that I had changed my instructions.
I might say that I meant the family to be guided
by the concept of fairness, not by any specific
conception of fairness I might have had in mind
(Dworkin 1978, 134).
Dworkin argues that it is the misunderstanding of the
difference between conceptions and concepts which has
confused our ideas about interpreting the Constitution's
vague clauses.

Dworkin asserts that the broad

constitutional clauses represent "appeals to the concepts
they employ, like legality, equality, and cruelty" (Dworkin
1978, 135).

He provides the example of the cruel and

unusual punishment provision.

He writes that it should not

matter that the death penalty was not considered cruel and
unusual punishment when the amendment was adopted, because
the framers provided us with a concept of cruel and unusual
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punishment, which we must reexamine ourselves, and make up
our own minds about what is cruel (Dworkin 1978, 135).
The Ninth Amendment steps in where the other amendments
leave off.

It traverses those gray areas where specificity

and restrictive words seem to work against the purposes of
justice and liberty, rather than for them.

The Ninth

Amendment responds to the fears of the Federalists that not
all rights can be listed, and guards against the notion that
by listing certain rights, all others are forfeited.
Allowing active interpretation of the Ninth Amendment also
permits the growth and change of our conceptions of liberty,
and for future generations to be able to respond to the
crises of their times, addressing John Dewitt's concerns
about future misunderstandings of what the written
Constitution actually secured.

The human experience is

marked by change, change in notions, traditions, and in what
is fundamentally important.

Bennett P. Patterson, in "The

Forgotten Ninth Amendment," wrote that as we become more
"civilized" we learn and change our views on things, such as
the women's movement and slavery (Patterson, 1989, 1:124).
Our rights are evolving, both enumerated and unenumerated.
The definition of cruel and unusual punishment is different
today than in the 1800s, as it will be in the future.

The

same will hold true to our definitions of unenumerated
rights (Black, Jr. 1989, 341).

Patterson furnished the

example of debtors' prison which was common at the time of
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the adoption of the Constitution.

There is no provision in

the Constitution to protect us from this, but debtors'
prison no longer fits our conception of justice.

He

provided the example of witchcraft, which was punishable in
the 1800s but would not be punished today.

Our ideas of

what is right and wrong, of justice, and even of the
Constitution itself, change with time.
The Supreme Court recognized the need for flexibility
in U.S. v. Classic (313 U.S. 299):
In determining whether a provision of the
Constitution applies to a new subject matter, it
is of little significance that it is one with
which the framers were not familiar, and hence,
the Supreme Court reads its words not as
legislative codes . . . but as the revelation of
the purposes which are intended to be achieved by
the Constitution as a continuing instrument of
government (1031).

Answering the Anti-Federalists
The Ninth Amendment not only responds to Federalist
fears, but it serves the Anti-Federalists' hopes as well.
The Amendment provides a clear textual basis for all claims,
and it serves as a legal check for the judiciary to employ.
As Calvin Massey wrote in his article, "Antifederalism and
the Ninth Amendment," unenumerated rights have a textual
basis so it seems inconceivable that they are somehow not
protected by judicial review (Massey, 1993, 2:275).

Given

time and usage, the clause may eventually garner the public
love and respect that will further protect the citizens from
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government intrusions, as people cherish the sentiment that
they have many rights to freely exercise.

Hamilton, in

Federalist 84, noted the importance of public support when
he wrote that security of rights depends on "public opinion,
and on the general spirit of the people and of the
government" (Rossiter 1961, 514).

Energizing the citizenry

with the notion of liberty through the Ninth Amendment helps
to ensure the future security of individual rights.

The

clause is also useful to future generations, allowing the
Constitution to be shaped to fit their crises.

"Whatever

the thoughtfulness of a past generation, the one thing that
we can be sure of is that its members did not discern our
particular world and apply their formidable intelligence to
solving its conundrums," and "even the most well-drafted of
statutes can become irrelevant or, what is worse, actively
counter-productive to the very concerns that gave them life
in the

first place" (Levinson 1993, 2:143).

NinthAmendment its

Giving the

true meaning is necessary, because, "The

rights retained by the people are limited only by their
imagination and could never be completely specified or
enumerated" (Barnett 1993, 2:8).

As Immanuel Kant wrote,

No one has a right to compel me to be happy in the
peculiar way in which he may think of the well
being of other men; but everyone is entitled to
seek his own happiness in the way that seems to
him best, if it does not infringe the liberty of
others in striving after a similar end for
themselves . . . (Olafson 1961, 161).
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The History of the Ninth Amendment

As has previously been discussed, the controversy over
a lack of a bill of rights in the new Constitution
threatened its ratification.

The Federalists finally

conceded the point, promising to propose a bill of rights
after the ratification of the proposed Constitution (Barnett
1993, 2:178).

Of course, the Constitution was ratified, but

the intended bill of rights was not immediately forthcoming.
James Madison, though known as the author of the Bill of
Rights, was not originally in favor of a bill of rights
(Morgan 1988, 131).

In his book James Madison on the

Constitution and the Bill of Rights, Robert J. Morgan
attempts to explain Madison's switch from an opponent of a
declaration of rights to the author and proponent of the
Bill of Rights.

First, Morgan notes that a response to a

call for the crafting of a bill of rights might open the
door to tampering with the proposed Constitution, and would
complicate the process of ratification (Morgan 1988, 132).
Madison also concluded that the call for a bill of rights
was mostly a ploy by Anti-Federalists to defeat ratification
of the Constitution.

In defense of the proposed

Constitution, Madison promised rights-securing amendments
after ratification (Morgan 1988, 135).

Although the

Constitution was ratified, and the first elections brought
in a Congress and President friendly to the new
Constitution, Madison was still concerned about the Anti-
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Federalist threat.

In May 1787 Madison presented his

proposed amendments to the House.

On June 8, 1789, Madison

urged the House to consider the proposed amendments, warning
that "Any further delay . . . would create suspicions, at
least, and might even inflame public opinion among the warm
supporters of a bill of rights" (Morgan 1988, 137).
Although he recognized the need for other pressing business
of the new government, Madison hinted that the new
government may face sharp criticism if a bill of rights was
not passed.

However, he also wanted to ensure that the call

for amendments did not open the door to tinkering with the
Constitution, but should be limited to securing rights that
everyone supported (Morgan 1988, 138).

Eventually, Madison

persuaded a Select Committee of the House to consider
proposed amendments to add to the Constitution (Barnett
1993, 2:4).

In an attempt to assuage the fears of the

Federalists, he proposed what would become the Ninth
Amendment:
The exceptions here or elsewhere in the
constitution, made in favor of particular rights,
shall not be construed as to diminish the just
importance of other rights retained by the people
or as to enlarge the powers delegated by the
constitution; but either as actual limitations of
such powers, or as inserted merely for greater
caution (Barnett 1993, 179).
During this speech, Madison clearly explained the true
purpose behind the Ninth Amendment.

He said,

It has been objected also against a bill of
rights, that, by enumerating particular exceptions
to the grant of power, it would disparage those
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rights which were not placed in that enumeration;
and it might follow, by implication, that those
rights which were not singled out, were intended
to be assigned into the hands of the General
Government, and were consequently insecure. This
is one of the most plausible arguments I have ever
heard urged against the admission of a bill of
rights into this system; but, I conceive, that it
may be guarded against. I have attempted it, as
gentlemen may see by turning to the last clause of
the fourth resolution (Barnett 1989, 60).
This clause was to become the Ninth Amendment.
The exceptions here or elsewhere in the
Constitution, made in favor of particular rights,
shall not be construed as to diminish the just
importance of other rights retained by the people
. . . (Barnett 1989, 55).
As Joseph Story noted in his Commentaries on the
Constitution,
This clause was manifestly introduced to prevent
any perverse, or ingenious misapplication of the
well known maxim, that an affirmation in
particular cases implies a negation in all others;
and e converso, that a negation in particular
cases implies an affirmation in all others (Story
1987, 711).
The Ninth Amendment received little to no attention
from courts and commentators up to 1965 (Caplan 1989, 243).
When it was referred to in early cases, it was often lumped
in with other amendments, and said to refer only to the
national government.

Bennett B. Patterson, in "The

Forgotten Ninth Amendment," explains one theory of why the
amendment has remained on a dusty shelf for so many years.
According to Patterson, in the case of Fox v. State of Ohio
(46 U.S. 410), the Court failed to distinguish between the
first eight amendments and the Ninth when it stated that
"those amendments" applied only to the national government

(Patterson 1989, 110).

Also, in Lessee of Livingston v.

Moore (32 U.S. 469), the Court stated that "those amendments
do not extend to the states" (Patterson 1989, 111).
Patterson argues that the Court was referring only to the
Seventh Amendment, though both the Seventh and Ninth
amendments were discussed in the case.

Patterson believes

that these confused references to the Ninth Amendment as
applying only to the national government influenced people
to ignore it for many years.

Patterson does note, however,

that in Eilenbecker v. District Court of Plymouth County,
Iowa (134 U.S. 31), the Court ruled that the first eight
amendments apply to the federal government, leaving the
implication that the Ninth Amendment applied to the states
(Patterson 1989, 114).
In 1965, the heretofore uninspired life of the Ninth
Amendment would be forever changed.

The U.S. Supreme Court

was confronted with the case of Griswold v. Connecticut (381
U.S. 479) in which the executive director of the Planned
Parenthood League of Connecticut and a physician associated
with the League were convicted as accessories to a crime for
giving information and advice on birth control to a married
couple.

Charged under an aiding and abetting law, they

supposedly violated a Connecticut statute that made it
illegal to use any drug or article to prevent conception.
The case was ultimately appealed to the Supreme Court, where
it became one of the most controversial cases of the
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century, and one which laid the foundation for the
popularity of Ninth Amendment and unenumerated rights
claims.
Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court
which declared that there are certain rights that, while not
mentioned specifically in the Constitution, have been
construed to exist under other rights, without which "the
specific rights would be less secure" (Griswold 482).

"In

other words, the

First Amendment, and other amendments, have

a penumbra where

privacy is protected from governmental

intrusion" (Griswold 483).

The Court stated that the

enumerated rights listed in the Bill of Rights have
"penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that
help give them life and substance" (Griswold 484).

The

Court listed the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth
amendments as the rights that form zones of privacy.
Griswold marked the beginning of the right to privacy,
followed by such

cases as Roe v. Wade (410 U.S. 113), Doe v.

Bolton (410 U.S.

479), and Eisenstadt v. Baird (405 U.S.

438), which built on the foundation laid in Griswold.
But perhaps more important to the life of the Ninth
Amendment was Justice Arthur Goldberg's now famous (or, to
his critics, infamous) concurring opinion.

Justice Goldberg

argued that there are several rights that have long since
been recognized by the Court despite the fact that they are
not specifically mentioned in the Constitution.

Goldberg
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went on to say that these rights exist because they are so
deeply ingrained in the traditions and consciousness of the
people that they are fundamental.

Goldberg directly seized

upon the Ninth Amendment and used it to underpin his
opinion.

Referring to the Ninth Amendment, Goldberg

mentioned the fact that the framers thought there were
additional fundamental rights protected from governmental
intrusion other than those listed in the first eight
amendments.

"Liberty" protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments, he asserted, protects unenumerated rights via
the Ninth Amendment with the same constitutional force and
authority as enumerated rights.

The unenumerated right that

was deserving of protection in the Griswold case was the
right of privacy in marriages, which comes from the
collective conscience of the people, and "from the totality
of the constitutional scheme under which we live" (Griswold
493-5) .
But not all of the justices on the Supreme Court
thought the decision was a proper one, and many critics
after the decision have thought the same.

Justices Black

and Stewart joined in dissent in this case, stating that
while the law was frivolous and "uncommonly silly," it was
not unconstitutional.

While several amendments such as the

Fourth and Fifth protect a right to privacy at certain
times, places, and under certain circumstances, there is no
general right to privacy in the Constitution.

Stewart
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argued that if the

people wanted to be rid of this law,

they

needed to persuadetheir representatives to repeal it.
According to Stewart, "That is the constitutional way to
take this law off the books" (Griswold 531).
Justice Hugo

Black, also dissenting,attempted to

refute Goldberg's reading of the Ninth and Tenth amendments.
He claimed that these amendments were meant to limit
government to those powers expressly granted in the
Constitution, not to open the door to numerous rights, or
for the Court to invalidate the laws of the legislatures.
According to Black, the role of the Court is not to keep the
Constitution up to date, or in tune with the social
atmosphere of the times; that is the purpose of the
representative branches of government.

Black also warned

that use of the Ninth Amendment is a thinly disguised bid
for judicial power, allowing judges to invalidate any
legislative acts they do not like.

He claimed that with

constant use of judicial review, and by loosening the rules
of the Constitution, there would be a great shift of power
to the courts in violation of the separation of powers.
The complaint of the justices, and of other critics, is
the same.

The legitimate role of the Court is not to strike

down laws simply because the judges do not like the law.
the law is a bad one, there are plenty of remedies for the
people through their duly elected legislatures.

If
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Another case in which the Ninth Amendment was appealed
to is Bowers v. Hardwick (478 U.S. 186) .

Hardwick was

challenging an anti-sodomy law, claiming that the statute
violated his privacy rights under the Ninth Amendment, a
"specific constitutional provision giving 'life and
substance' to our understanding of privacy" (Bowers 201).
Justice Byron White delivered the opinion of the Court.
White claimed that the precedents in this area, Meyer v.
Nebraska (43 S.Ct. 625), Griswold, and Roe all dealt with
family, marriage, or procreative rights, not just any sexual
activity between two consenting adults.

In order to support

this right according to Griswold, it must be "deeply rooted"
in the national conscience, or must be implicit in the
concept of liberty.

White wrote that to even suggest that

homosexual sex is either of these things is "at best,
facetious" (Bowers 194).

White argued that homosexual

activity has always been against the law:

through common

law, at the time when the Constitution was ratified, and
throughout the states.
Dissenting in this case, Justice Harry Blackmun
asserted that simply because a law has been around a long
time does not make it right.

Blackmun quoted Holmes'

observation that
[i]t is revolting to have no better reason for a rule
of law than that so it was laid down in the time of
Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds
upon which it was laid down have vanished long since,
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and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of
the past3 (Bowers 199).
Blackmun argued that we protect marriage and procreation not
because of some social value placed on these things, but
because they are central to individuals in defining
themselves and their lives.

He wrote,

The Court claims that its decision today merely
refuses to recognize a fundamental right to engage
in homosexual sodomy; what the Court really has
refused to recognize is the fundamental interest
all individuals have in controlling the nature of
their intimate associations with others (Bowers
206) .
Blackmun contended that the real danger to this country is
neither usurpation by the judiciary nor the recognition of a
nontraditional lifestyle, but rather the refusal to uphold
minority rights against the prejudices of the majority.

He

wrote,
. . . depriving individuals of the right to choose for
themselves how to conduct their intimate relationships
poses a far greater threat to the values most deeply
rooted in our Nation's history than tolerance of
nonconformity could ever do (Bowers 214).
The Griswold case heralded dozens of cases appealing to
the Ninth Amendment as an attempt to justify individual
rights (Caplan 1989, 243).

The right to smoke marijuana in

the home, the right to an abortion, the freedom to conduct
one's personal sex life without official intrusion, freedom
of movement, the right to wear one's hair any way one wants,
the right to a healthful environment, the right to enjoy
301iver Wendell Holmes, "The Path of the Law,"
Law Review. 457, 469 (1897).
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natural resources, the right not to wear a crash helmet, the
right to teach in public schools, the right to sue the
federal government, freedom from the military draft, the
right of access to the courts, and the right to engage in
political activity are just some of the cases that have
sprung up in the past few decades laying claim to the Ninth
Amendment (Shaw 1990, 109-111).

Not all of these cases have

succeeded in their claims; but they have, for the first
time, bolstered their arguments with the "forgotten" Ninth
Amendment.

The Ninth Amendment and States' Rights
The Ninth Amendment, however, does fail to address one
major complaint of the Anti-Federalists.

It does not

protect states' rights versus the national government.

The

Pennsylvania Minority objected to the powers described in
the new constitution since the national government "must
necessarily annihilate and absorb the legislative,
executive, and judicial powers of the several
states . . . ."

A proposed amendment to the Constitution by

the Anti-Federalists demonstrates their concerns.

The very

first amendment desired was "that it be explicitly declared
that all Powers not expressly delegated by the aforesaid
Constitution are reserved to the several States to be by
them exercised" (Ketcham 1986, 242).

37
As indicated by the words of the Ninth Amendment, the
clause speaks to rights retained by the "people," not the
states.

Paradoxically, some current commentators have

claimed that the sole original purpose of the Ninth
Amendment was to protect states' rights.

They assert that

the Ninth Amendment was ratified to assure the people that
all rights protected under the state constitutions would
retain their full effect under the new system.

Robert Bork,

though not an active proponent of the theory, stated at his
confirmation hearings that this explanation was the only one
"that has any plausibility to it that I have seen so far"
(Barnett 1993, 2:433).

The "retained rights" referred to in

the Ninth Amendment, this theory asserts, are the rights
existing at the time of adoption in the states'
constitutions.

Raoul Berger supports this opinion in his

article, "The Ninth Amendment," indicating that the states
wanted the Ninth Amendment to protect them from a strong
national government (Berger 1989, 1:208-10).

Berger notes

that at that time, it was the states that were regarded as
the protectors of liberty, not the national government, and
the amendment was simply an assurance that these liberties
would still be intact under the new regime.

Added to this

is the idea that the Ninth Amendment cannot be used to
invalidate state laws because Madison, the author of the
Ninth Amendment, originally wanted to insert the clause in
Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution, the area
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specifically referring only to the national government
(Levinson 1993, 2:129).

Also, in Adamson v. California (67

S.Ct. 1672), the Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth
Amendment does not incorporate all of the amendments in the
Bill of Rights and apply them to the states.
Russell Caplan takes up the torch from there with an
interesting view of the role of the Ninth Amendment in the
constitutional scheme.

Caplan also supports the view that

the Ninth Amendment was merely a protective clause for the
states against the national government, however Caplan takes
the argument a little further in his article "The History
and Meaning of the Ninth Amendment" (Caplan 1989).

He

argues that the Ninth Amendment was enacted to protect the
states' pre-existing laws and constitutions, thus the
amendment is looking back, enforcing things that were in
effect before the amendments were ratified.

Caplan argues

that the Ninth was meant to be paired with the Tenth
Amendment, and it is the Tenth Amendment that looks forward,
protecting the states' power from future encroachment by the
national government.

By pairing these two amendments,

Caplan limits the meaning of the Ninth Amendment to a
one-shot protection clause of those rights that were
protected by state constitutions only at the time of
ratification of the Bill of Rights.

Caplan adds a unique

twist to this argument stating that the Ninth Amendment
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certainly cannot now be used toinvalidate state laws since
its very purpose was to protect them.
However, a serious look at history bolsters an
expansive reading of the amendment (Macedo 1993, 2:151).
The real meaning and intent of the framers is shown by the
fact that around the 1800s many state constitutions had
clauses similar to the Ninth Amendment, and thus the people
back then understood it to mean what it says, and not as
some restriction on national power.

As John Ely wrote in

his article "The Ninth Amendment,"
The fact that the constitution-makers in, say,
Maine and Alabama in 1819 saw fit to include in
their bills of rights provisions that were
essentially identical to the Ninth Amendment is
virtually conclusive evidence that they understood
it to mean what it said and not simply to relate
to the limits of federal power (Ely 1989, 183).
Since the adoption of the Constitution, twenty-nine states
have added a clause similar to the Ninth Amendment
(Kettleborough 1918).

The Constitution of the Confederate

States of America also contained a similar provision
(Barnett 1989, 29).

Article VI, Section 5 of the

Confederate Constitution is nearly verbatim of the Ninth
Amendment:
The enumeration, in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people of the
several States (Kilpatrick 1961, 28).
If the amendment was intended solely to protect states'
rights at the time of ratification, there would be no cause
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for similar provisions for newly formed states in the Union,
or in the Confederate Constitution.

Early Protection for Unenumerated Rights

Several early cases under the new Constitution also
show that the founders understood that unenumerated rights
were deserving of constitutional protection.

In Calder v.

Bull (3 U.S. 386) and Savings and Loan Association v. Topeka
(87 U.S. 686), the Supreme Court stated that certain
inherent human rights are entitled to protection even though
they are not numbered in the Constitution (Patterson 1989,
Is 115).

In Calder, Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase said

in the opinion of the Court that there was some legislation
that, although not specifically restricted by the
Constitution, could be struck down if it violated certain
principles of "free Republican governments" (Calder 388).

CHAPTER 3

A WORKING THEORY

The Ninth Amendment has the potential to be a cherished
protector of liberty.
very recently.

Yet it has remained dormant until

Only after the landmark case of Griswold v.

Connecticut, in which the Ninth Amendment was referred to,
has the amendment been appealed to with any conviction or
frequency.

Awakening interest in the Ninth Amendment is

most likely the result of the huge interference on the
individual of the ever growing bureaucratic state over the
past fifty years (Arnold 1993, 2:257).

Defining Unenumerated Rights

But what are the rights protected by the Ninth
Amendment?

How do we determine what they are?

At his

confirmation hearings discussing enumerated rights, Justice
Anthony M. Kennedy quipped, " . . .

'Come out, come out,

wherever you are', looking for the sources and the
definitions of unenumerated rights" (Barnett 1993, 2:465).
Perhaps to attempt to define and enumerate unenumerated
rights would be contrary to the obvious intent and meaning
41
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of the amendment (Patterson 1989, 120).

But, in order to

protect these rights, there must be some way of determining
what they are.

There are many theories on the definition of

Ninth Amendment rights.

Massey claims that the Ninth

protects both natural and positive rights just as the first
eight amendments do (Massey 1989, 1;310-11).

Randy Barnett

writes that unenumerated rights should be protected against
both illegal means and ends employed by government (Barnett
1993, 591).

According to the Griswold opinion, the rights

under the Ninth come from three sources:

the traditions and

the conscience of our people, experience with the
requirements of a free society, and the fundamental
principles of liberty (Caplan 1989, 1:245).

Others point to

the fact that interpreting the Ninth is the same as with the
rest of the Constitution.

It could even be done by the

"originalist" method of looking at the framers' notes,
proposed amendments, speeches of the day, and the like
(Barnett 1989, 35).

Interpreting the Ninth could be seen

the same as giving meaning to the open-ended "necessary and
proper" clause (Barnett 1989, 37).

Or, one could use

enumerated rights as points of departure to find
unenumerated rights through "common underlying values"
(Black, Jr. 1989, 347).
The problems with the Ninth Amendment are problems with
the law in general; in determining means and ends of
protection, defining what counts, accepting that it may have
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to be redone, and that mistakes are made (Black, Jr. 1989,
340).

The core of the dilemma is that the amendment appears

to command that we search for unenumerated rights, yet
provides no clues as to what these rights are, or how to
determine their meaning.

Some skeptics of the Ninth

Amendment, such as Raoul Berger, have pointed out that if
the clause is given a broad interpretation, it gives the
judiciary a "bottomless well" to use at their "limitless
discretion" (Barnett 1993, 182-3).

There are also theorists

who believe that the Constitution should be read and
interpreted with the intent of the framers in mind (Maltz
1993, 2:261).

These "originalists" believe that there is no

way to determine what the framers intended unenumerated
rights to be, and therefore they are unenforceable.

The

founders wanted rights to be protected from the
Constitution, not by the Constitution (Maltz 1993, 2:262).
That is, rights should be protected from encroachment by the
government.

If the government is viewed as the protector of

rights, it is given a claim to power over the protection and
enforcement of rights, and the government's power is
enlarged by the Constitution, rather than restrained by it.
However, supporters of a sweeping reading of the
Constitution, such as Ronald Dworkin, note that limiting the
rights of the people to the few listed in the first eight
amendments, and in the body of the Constitution, gives
government overwhelming power, and takes the principles of
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the Constitution and reduces the text to "a document with
the texture and tone of an insurance policy or a standard
form commercial lease" (Dworkin 1992, 384).

The Presumption of Liberty

Resolving the issue of what is an unenumerated right, a
right retained by the people, can be accomplished through
Randy Barnett's theory of the "presumption of liberty."

In

his theory, the judiciary would approach any claim to an
unenumerated right with the presumption that individuals
have the freedom to do whatever it is that they are
claiming. This shifts the burden to the government to
justify its conduct.

If the government cannot defend its

actions and show that the objective cannot be achieved
without violations to citizens' rights, then the citizen
deserves to win and the government deserves to lose (Barnett
1989, 26).

As Justice Brandeis wrote, "every unjustifiable

intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the
individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a
violation of the [Constitution]" (Schwartz 1968, 171).

This

method does not mean that the government will always lose.
Rather, it implies a burden of justification upon the
government to warrant its activities, both in using
expressly delegated powers and implied, means-oriented
powers.

45
This method is also similar to the technique judges use
in adjudicating cases concerning enumerated rights.

For

example, there is a presumption of free speech, and any
governmental intrusion is closely scrutinized (Barnett 1989,
42).

Barnett's approach works to limit government, not

expand it.

It leaves certain areas that neither state nor

national governments have the power to regulate (Kelsey
1989, 93).

It creates a "sea of rights surrounding islands

of government powers," rather than a "sea of governmental
powers surrounding islands of individual rights" (Barnett
1989, 43).

This theory was hinted at in U.S. v. Carolene

Products Co. (304 U.S. 144) in the famous Footnote 4, when
Justice Harlan F. Stone wrote,
There may be narrower scope for operation of the
presumption of constitutionality when legislation
appears on its face to be within a specific
prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of
the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally
specific when held to be embraced within the
Fourteenth {emphasis added} (Carolene 152).
The Court signaled that the presumption of the
constitutionality of legislation would face a more serious
challenge when the legislation in question impinged upon a
particular clause of the Constitution.

Note that the Court

recognized the first ten amendments, which, of course, would
include the Ninth Amendment, as specific provisions that
could test the presumption of constitutionality of
legislation.
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Unenumerated Rights
Are Similar to Listed Rights
Unenumerated rights under the Ninth Amendment are not
so different to interpret as the numbered rights.

Despite

the fact that rights are listed, judges still must interpret
enumerated rights, because they are vague, general
declarations of right, just like the Ninth Amendment.

As

Henry Manne noted in his essay "Reconciling Different Views
About Constitutional Interpretation," "The meaning of words
are notoriously vague, ambiguous, and volatile . . . "
(Manne 1989, 58).

The "enumerated" rights are filled with

vague and ambiguous terms that must be defined by the
judiciary.

What is excessive bail?

unusual punishment?
seizure?

What is cruel and

What is unreasonable search and

The enumerated rights require subjective

interpretation just as unenumerated rights do.
The First Amendment right to free speech is a good
example of this concept since it is a broad guarantee that
has required more narrow definitions of its meaning
throughout the years.
this right.

The Court has been asked to interpret

In the case of Martin v. Struthers (63 S.Ct.

862) the Court held that freedom of speech and the press
includes the right to distribute literature and the right to
receive it.

There is no textual provision that states this,

but the Court has interpreted an enumerated right.

The

courts have done this continuously, in determining whether
free speech is anything from picketing to wearing black

armbands (Black, Jr. 1989, 342).
"Unenumerated Rights:

In his essay,

Whether and How Roe Should be

Overturned," Dworkin illustrates this point (Dworkin 1992).
He compares the

Court's protection of flag burning under the

First Amendment

right to free speech, and the protection

from gender discrimination under the Equal Protection
Clause, to the protection of the right to an abortion as an
unenumerated right.
protection from

He notes that neither flag burning nor

gender discrimination are specifically

mentioned in the document itself, but

all are guaranteed by

the general principles of the Constitution.

The

interpretation of the enumerated rights to include flag
burning and gender equality are the same thing as the
interpretation of unenumerated rights.

He claims these

things do not flow from the intent of the framers, but from
the political principles that guide our country.
Unenumerated rights can also be seen as having the same
limits as the listed rights.

Richard A. Epstein, in his

article, "Property, Speech, and the Politics of Distrust,"
wrote, "Freedom of speech is not the same as an uninhibited
license to speak . . . ." (Epstein 1992, 45).

Courts have

not interpreted the First Amendment to mean that government
actions may never in any manner affect speech, but that when
they do, the government is under a heavy burden to justify
its conduct (Barnett 1993, 2:27).

Justice Oliver Wendell

Holmes, in the Schenck v. U.S. (39 S.Ct. 247) decision,
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wrote, "The most stringent protection of free speech would
not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a crowded
theatre and causing a panic" (Schenck 249).

In Gitlow v.

New York (45 S.Ct. 625), the Court curbed free speech by
upholding a New York statute prohibiting speech that
threatens overthrow of the government by unlawful means.
Chief Justice Fred Vinson, in Feiner v. New York (71 S.Ct.
303), wrote that the right to free speech does not include
the right to incite a riot.

Again, in Chaplinsky v. State

of New Hampshire (62 S.Ct. 766), the right of speech was not
declared an absolute right.

Justice Frank Murphy wrote the

opinion, stating that Congress can regulate lewd, obscene,
libelous speech, and "fighting words - those which by their
very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate
breach of the peace" (Chaplinsky 766) .

If the enumerated

right of free speech can be limited and defined, then
unenumerated rights would surely face similar limitations.

Recognition of Unenumerated Rights

Many unenumerated rights have already been recognized
with little controversy about their existence or need to be
sheltered.

In Meyer v. Nebraska (43 S.Ct. 625) the Court

stated that certain unenumerated rights were necessary "to
enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men"
(Meyer 626).

For example, the right to associate was
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secured in NAACP v. Alabama (357 U.S. 449).

The right to

be presumed innocent was found to exist in Estelle v.
Williams (425 U.S. 501) decided in 1975.

In 1970, in the

case of In re Winship (397 U.S. 358), the right to proof
beyond a reasonable doubt became a fundamental right in our
criminal justice system.

The right to bring up children and

direct their education was protected in Pierce v. Society of
Sisters (45 S.Ct. 571).

The right to marry, to establish a

home, and the right to have offspring have all been shielded
as fundamental rights retained by the people in Skinner v.
Oklahoma (62 S.Ct. 1110) . Lochner v. New York (25 S.Ct.
539) gave the right to contract, though this case is now
widely considered illegitimate.

The right to forward one's

own political views was protected by the Ninth Amendment in
the case of United Public Workers v. Mitchell (37 S.Ct.
556).

The right to pursue an occupation without state

interference was declared in Schware v. Board of Bar
Examiners (77 S.Ct. 752).

The right for the media to attend

trials is not listed in the Constitution, but became a
protected right in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia
(448 U.S. 555).

In this case, the Court admitted that there

is no enumeration of this right, but said that traditionally
the media and public had been attending trials, and this
right is part of the First Amendment.
In Kent v. Dulles (78 S.Ct. 1113), the right to travel
was declared.

Supporting that decision was the case of

Aptheker v. Secretary of State (378 U.S. 500) in which the
right to travel at home and abroad was found to be an
important aspect of liberty.

In U.S. v. Guest (383 U.S.

745), the Court again reaffirmed this right by stating that,
"The Constitutional right to travel from one State to
another . . . occupies a position fundamental to the concept
of our Federal Union . . . [F]reedom to travel throughout
the United States has long been recognized as a basic right
under the Constitution" (Guest 758).

The opinion goes on to

recognize that while the right to travel is not specifically
listed in the Constitution, it is basic and elementary.
Again, in Shapiro v. Thompson (394 U.S. 618), the Court
found that the Constitution guarantees the right of
interstate travel.

In dealing with an uncontroversial

subject, the Supreme Court "points to the absence of an
explicit textual home for the right with pride, as a kind of
evidence of the centrality of the right to the
constitutional project of which it is indisputably a part"
(Sager 1993, 2:255).
All of these unenumerated rights have been relatively
supported because of their uncontroversial nature.

The

criticisms of unenumerated rights arise when controversial
subjects, such as abortion, are linked to an unenumerated
right, such as the right to privacy.

The right to privacy

is not so controversial in and of itself, except that the
legal right to abortion flows from it (Barnett 1993, 2:413).

51
The right to privacy has been mentioned by the Court on
numerous occasions.

Justice Brandeis, in his dissent in

Olmstead stated, "The right to be let alone [is] the most
comprehensive of rights, and the right most valued by
civilized men" (Olmstead 572).

The opinion in Frank v.

Maryland (79 S.Ct. 804) recognized the "essential right of
privacy" that is "protected by the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment" (Frank 808).

Again, in Stanley v.

Georgia (394 U.S. 557), the Court wrote, "For also
fundamental is the right to be free, except in very limited
circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into
one's privacy" (Stanley 564).
When the right of privacy comes under assault, it is
generally due to the controversial nature of a particular
issue, such as birth control, abortion, or homosexual
activity, rather than the broad concept of a right to
privacy.

In the case of Poe v. Ullman (367 U.S. 497),

though the case was dismissed due to injusticiability,
dissenting justices said that the laws prohibiting use of
contraceptives were "an invasion of the privacy that is
implicit in a free society" (Poe 509, 521).

In Eisenstadt

v. Baird (405 U.S. 438), the opinion read, "If the right of
privacy means anything it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person
as the decision whether to bear or beget a child"
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(Eisenstadt 453).

But the most controversial of the

"privacy rights" which has brought ire down upon
unenumerated rights, was the decision in Roe v. Wade (410
U.S. 113) .

In this case, the Court declared that the right

to privacy encompassed a woman's right to terminate her
pregnancy if she chose to.

In the opinion of the Supreme

Court, "This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the
Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and
restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the
District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's
reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to
encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy" (Roe 153).

The emotional debate over abortion

and the right to privacy has threatened the recognition of
other, less controversial unenumerated rights.

Similar

cases with equally unpopular issues have made it to the
Supreme Court, but not necessarily with the same outcome.
The case of Bowers v. Hardwick (478 U.S. 186) was an attempt
to strike down sodomy laws which were claimed to deny
homosexuals their right to privacy and to conduct their
sexual lives without interference by the government.

The

claim was denied, and the anti-sodomy law was upheld.
As a comparison of the right to travel and the Roe and
Hardwick decisions illustrate, the acceptance of the concept
of unenumerated rights has more to do with the actual right
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claimed, and its controversial nature, than a debate over
the existence of unenumerated rights.

Judicial Review, Judicial Activism,
and the Ninth Amendment
Expanded use of the Ninth Amendment is open to the
problems associated with judicial discretion.

It has been

argued that the Supreme Court, through extensive use of
judicial review, has usurped power from the other two
branches, and exercises extraordinary powers (Mace and
Melone 1988).

Judicial review is the power of the Court to

overturn acts of the other two branches of government, or of
the state governments, as unconstitutional.

Activist

decisions are those opinions that do not defer to the
legislative or executive branch, that do not adhere closely
to only specific textual provisions of the Constitution, or
that do not follow original intent.

Judicial activism and

the Ninth Amendment seem to go hand in hand.

Discussing the

issue at his confirmation hearings before the Senate, Bork
stated,
I do not think you can use the ninth amendment [sic]
unless you know something of what it means. For
example, if you had an amendment that says "Congress
shall make no" and then there is an ink blot and you
cannot read the rest of it and that is the only copy
you have, I do not think the court can make up what
might be under the ink blot if you cannot read it
(Barnett 1993, 2:441).
Of course, the Ninth Amendment is not hidden beneath an ink
stain.

The words are clear, and we know what it says, but
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the problem is that the words do not reveal specific rights
and provisions.

The criticisms of judicial activism, and

hence of the use of the Ninth Amendment, rely on the
principles of original intent, majoritarianism, and the
danger of the personal preferences of the judge deciding
cases.

Originalism and the Constitutionality
of Judicial Review
The first claim against the legitimacy of judicial
review is that this power is simply unconstitutional.

The

power of judicial review is nowhere explicitly mentioned in
the Constitution.

Rather, opponents claim, the Court has

usurped this power over the years through a series of cases,
starting with Marbury v. Madison (5 U.S. 137, Mace and
Melone 1988, 19).

Many of the advocates of this position

adhere to the theory of the intent of the framers, or
originalist theory.

Originalist doctrine demands that

judges look to the intent of the framers of the Constitution
to guide them in their decisions.

Originalists often claim

that if the framers had intended to grant the Supreme Court
the power of judicial review, they would have included
explicit words in the document to that effect.

However,

since no such phrasing exists, neither should the power.
This theory has severe problems as a serious guide to
constitutional interpretation.

First and foremost, it is

nearly impossible to discern what the intent of the framers
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actually was.

The records of the convention are incomplete,

and offer conflicting testimony.

There was more than one

person at the convention, and certainly it cannot be
proposed that all of the framers had exactly the same intent
on every phrase of the Constitution.

Also, the intentions

of the state conventions, or even all of the people who
eventually ratified the Constitution are impossible to
discover (Shaman 1992, 39).

There is considerable evidence

that the framers were not only aware of the concept of
judicial review, but many actively supported the idea (Beard
1988, 42).

In fact, Hamilton clearly indicated judicial

review would be a factor under the new Constitution in
Federalist 16, when he wrote,
If the judges were not embarked in a conspiracy
with the legislature, they would pronounce the
resolutions of such a majority to be contrary to
the supreme law of the land, unconstitutional, and
void (Rossiter 1961, 117).
Hamilton also specifically spelled out the powers of the
judiciary in Federalist 78:
The interpretation of the laws is the proper and
peculiar province of the courts. A constitution
is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges
as, a fundamental law. It therefore belongs to
them to ascertain its meaning as well as the
meaning of any particular act proceeding from the
legislative body. If there should happen to be an
irreconcilable variance between the two, that
which has the superior obligation and validity
ought, of course, to be preferred; or, in other
words, the Constitution ought to be preferred to
the statute . . . " (Rossiter 1961, 467).
Even if all this were not true, the theory of originalism is
still bankrupt for several reasons.

As Jeffrey Shaman
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writes in "Interpreting the Constitution:

The Supreme

Court's Proper and Historic Function," "following the will
of the 55 persons who supposedly framed the Constitution or
the smaller group of them who actually participated in the
framing is hardly an exercise in democracy" (Shaman 1992,
41).

Nor does it say anywhere within the Constitution that

the rule for interpreting the document is to follow the
framers' intent.

For all of these reasons, originalism

fails to be a decisive indicator in the debate concerning
judicial review.

The Undemocratic Nature of
Judicial Review

Another argument against judicial review is that it is
undemocratic.

It is asserted that nine individuals

nullifying acts of the popularly elected branches is
inherently undemocratic (Mace and Melone 1988, 24).

In

Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists (476 U.S. 747), Justice White explains in his
dissenting opinion that certain "issues in our society are
best resolved by the will of the people, either as expressed
through legislation or through the general principles they
have already incorporated into the Constitution they have
adopted" (Thornburgh 796).

In a democratic society, the

will of the people is expressed through their legislature,
and should be given the widest latitude possible.

The

rights retained by the people can be enacted through

57
legislatures, through state laws, and through constitutional
amendments (Berger 1989, 205).

The problem with the Ninth

Amendment, according to Bork, is that it provides no text to
determine its meaning, and therefore no law for the judge to
apply.

And when there is no law for a judge to apply, there

is no function for the judge to perform.

As Bork states it,

" [democratic choice must be accepted by the judge where the
Constitution itself is silent" (Barnett 1993, 2:21).
But the assertion that judicial review is undemocratic,
and hence illegitimate in our system, fails to recognize
that the American system of government is a constitutional
democracy, meaning it is a democracy with limitations on
what the majority may do (Shaman 1992, 41).
Jackson,in West Virginia Board of
(319U.S. 624),

Justice Robert

Education v. Barnette

described why this concept is

vital to the

idea of liberty,
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to
withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of
political controversy, to place them beyond the
reach of majorities and officials and to establish
them as legal principles to be applied by courts.
. . . fundamental rights may not be submitted to
vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections
(West Virginia 638).
Perhaps the Court should be thought of as
anti-democratic, rather than undemocratic.

It can hardly be

denied that the Supreme Court has undemocratic
characteristics, but it can be considered anti-democratic in
that it fosters good democracy.

In pursuit of a better

democracy, the Court acts as a counter-majoritarian force to
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uphold minority rights and facilitate full participation by
all groups in society (Mace and Melone 1988, 27).

Removing Issues from Public Debate

Some critics of judicial review argue that by allowing
the courts to make final decisions, important issues are
removed from public discussion.

As Michael W. McConnell

states in "A Moral Realist Defense of Constitutional
Democracy," republican government is a better way to secure
rights than by assigning power to judges, and removing
issues from public debate (McConnell 1993, 93).

McConnell

writes, "We are willing to bear the risk that the community
will sometimes be wrong because the risks posed by the
alternatives are worse" (McConnell 1993, 73).
However, despite what the opposition to judicial review
claims, the Supreme Court is not the final arbiter on
issues.

Judicial decisions are not the final say on any

subject.

"Its decisions are reviewable by Congress, which

with some frequency overrules them" (Levinson 1993, 144).
Several amendments have been adopted in reaction to
unpopular Supreme Court decisions.

In Oregon v. Mitchell

(400 U.S. 112), the Supreme Court ruled on the 1970 federal
Voting Rights Act which lowered the voting age from
twenty-one to eighteen in local, state, and national
elections.

In that ruling, the voting age was upheld at the

national level, but rejected for the state elections because
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the justices ruled that the Congress overstepped its bounds
of power by making voting requirements for the states
(Cultice 1992, 171).

Within a year, the Twenty-sixth

Amendment giving the vote to every citizen at the age of
eighteen, was ratified (Cultice 1992, 214).
Also, the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution was
"adopted to overturn an early Supreme Court decision4 that
an out-of-state plaintiff could sue a state in federal court
to collect a debt" (Orth 1987, 7).

One need only examine

the abortion issue to realize that a controversy is not
finally disposed of by a Supreme Court decision.

Personal Biases of Judges

Another argument against judicial review is that judges
will insert their own preferences into their decisions,
basing invalidation of laws not on the Constitution, but on
their own personal biases.

Using such vague provisions as

due process, equal protection, or the Ninth Amendment allows
judges to nullify virtually anything (Boudin 1988, 137).
Judicial review used to be an extraordinary power used in
extraordinary circumstances but now, critics claim, it is
ordinary and used all the time (Boudin 1988, 137).

Analysts

complain that judges no longer invalidate legislation based
on whether it is a clear violation of the Constitution, as
James B. Thayer urges in "The Origin and Scope of the
4Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dali. 419.
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American Doctrine of Constitutional Law" (Thayer 1988, 71).
Rather, the new standard is not whether Congress has the
power to pass such legislation, but whether that power is
wisely used (Boudin 1988, 139).

It is charged that the

judiciary compares contested acts against their own policy
predispositions, rather than against the Constitution.
Critics fear a powerful judiciary broadly interpreting a
vacuous, limitless clause and shaping the Constitution and
the law into whatever they wish.

For example, Raoul Berger

is concerned that the courts will become "Big Brother," and
attempt to control the people.

He believes the Court will

use the Ninth Amendment to "make [the people] free and
virtuous if they have to force them to be free and cram
virtue down their throats" (Berger 1989, 218).

This

"bottomless well" for the judiciary takes government out of
the hands of the people and into the courts.

It leaves the

Constitution open to a judge's opinion of what is right
(McConnell 1993, 76).
[W]hen a strict interpretation of the Constitution,
according to the fixed rules which govern the
interpretation of laws, is abandoned, and the
theoretical opinions of individuals are allowed to
control its meaning, we have no longer a Constitution;
we are under the government of individual men, who for
the time being have power to declare what the
Constitution is, according to their own views of what
it ought to mean (McConnell 1993, 85).
Commentators claim that judicial review destroys the
judiciary in the eyes of the public, turning it into a
partial, subjective institution, whereas it has always been
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thought of as an impartial body relying on objective law to
reach its decisions (Massey 1993, 300).

Soon the judiciary

would be relying on religion and morality rather than
political theory and law (Rapaczynski 1993, 196).

Critics

also claim it causes an imbalance of powers between the
branches of government (Massey 1993, 300).

McConnell argues

that judges are the worst ones we could enlist to interpret
the Constitution so broadly for the rest of society.

He

claims they are totally unrepresentative of the people.
Judges are generally older white men, upper class, isolated,
and, perhaps most importantly, not accountable in most
instances of judgeship.

Federal judges, and specifically

Supreme Court justices, are appointed for life, and
McConnell states, "Power without responsibility is not a
happy combination" (McConnell 1993, 89).
The fear of judicial tyranny is a valid concern, but
there are other threats that may be worse.

The tyranny of

the majority is even more dangerous, and it was the one that
Madison feared the most in his discussions about factions in
Federalist 10 (Rossiter 1961).

It seems only logical that

in order to protect rights of the minority from the
majority, or rights of the individual from society, the
courts must necessarily be the forum for the preservation of
these rights.

"Whereas, the enumerated powers of Article I

operate against the states and the people, the judicial
power of negation operates against the other branches"

62
(Barnett 1993, 2:42).

Individual rights are the rights

most likely to be infringed by legislatures, so it is the
unique duty of the judiciary to protect them (Massey 1993,
275).

Judges are isolated from the whims of the majority,

and thus are better equipped to protect the rights of the
minority which may be vulnerable to neglect or abuse by the
other branches of government (Sager 1993, 244).
notes, in "On Reading the Ninth Amendment:

As McIntosh

A Reply to Raoul

Berger," enforcement and encroachment are two different
things (McIntosh 1989, 226).

Protecting rights and

enforcing them against the other two branches is not the
same as infringing rights.

Controls on the Judiciary
While the problem of a zealous judiciary exists, it can
be guarded against.
the power of judges.

There are several factors that limit
As Hamilton argued in Federalist 78,

The judiciary . . . has no influence over either
the sword or the purse; no direction of either the
strength or of the wealth of the society, and can
take no active resolution whatever. It may truly
be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL but merely
judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid
of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its
judgments (Rossiter 1961, 465).
The judiciary must rely on the compliance of the other
branches, and of the people.
Judges have to justify their decisions, both to others
in the legal profession and to the public (Melone 1988,
263).

Judges are constrained by stare decisis, statutes,
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and the Constitution.

Justices are subject to impeachment,

and must be appointed by the president and confirmed by the
Senate.

The judiciary is bound by certain principles of

adjudication, such as adhering to precedent, the "case or
controversy" limitation of Article III of the Constitution,
and certain maxims of self restraint, such as deciding on
grounds other than constitutional controversies if possible,
and avoiding "political questions" (Carr 1942, 185-197).
Finally, judges can only strike down offending
legislation, not enact new laws (Barnett 1993, 2:19).
Judicial review does not necessarily expand the power of the
courts, rather it can be seen as limiting the power of the
other two branches.

Judicial review is negative and

limiting, indicating that "the brakes of our constitutional
machinery are more important than the ignition system"
(Mason 1987, 437).

Coupled with this idea is that the true

value of judicial review is not nullification, but
validation of laws.

If the Court has the power to overturn

a law, yet supports that law, it legitimizes the actions of
the other branches of government, or the acts of state
governments (Black, Jr. 1989, 11).

The Court thereby adds

to the legitimacy of the actions of the other two branches,
and supports the idea of limited government, by indicating
that there are certain boundaries that the legislature may
not cross (Black, Jr. 1989, 11).
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Judicial Restraint and Activism

Proponents of judicial activism cite that judicial
review is necessary for some important reasons.

First, as

John Marshall asserted in Marbury v. Madison (5 U.S. 137),
judicial review is a necessary power of the courts.
Building on Article III and the Supremacy Clause, Marshall
noted that the government that the Constitution set up was
meant to be a limited government, and the only way to
constrict government is to oblige government to watch
itself.

In order to accomplish this, the Constitution set

up a semi-independent branch to check the other two.

If

Congress were to pass an ex post facto law or bill of
attainder, where else but the courts could injured parties
seek relief?

Majoritarians claim that is up to the people

to fix, but if unpopular minorities' rights are violated,
the majority is unlikely to be a fair judge in its own cause
(Black, Jr. 1989, 8-10).

Minority rights are to be

protected, even at the discomfort of the majority.

As

Black, Jr. argues in "The Building Work of Judicial Review,"
while not everyone will agree with the decisions of the
Supreme Court, we can agree on the process.

When the

government is obliged to be the judge in its own case, the
system must provide for as much of an independent, impartial
arbiter as possible.

He writes that the judiciary provides

the independence and specialized knowledge necessary to make

65
the system as fair as it can be (Black, Jr. "Building Work,"
1989, 9).
The conservatives in contemporary politics argue that
the "liberal" Court has twisted the Constitution and
rendered it a hollow document into which it can pour its own
meaning.

However, judicial activism is not limited to one

party or ideology.

Daniel Novak asserts in his article

"Economic Activism and Restraint," that the Marshall and
Taney courts were activists in the economic realm supporting
business (Novak 1984, 80).

Indeed, the Lochner era has been

criticized for its economic activism.

In a study examining

the decisions of "restraintist" judges, Anthony Champagne
and Stuart S. Nagel found that judicial restraint is
actually often used to support certain policy preferences.
If judicial restraint is not applied consistently, without
regard to what interests may benefit by its use, then it
isn't really restraint.

Restraint must not be concerned

solely with results (Champagne and Nagel 1984, 316).
In a similar study, Harold J. Spaeth and Stuart H.
Teger examined levels of judicial deference to legislative
acts to determine if judges were really restraintist or
activist.

They found that judges tended to vote to uphold

their personal biases.

"The point here is not to argue that

the justices are activists, but rather to show that
considerations of activism and restraint are absent from
their decision making.

Considerations of substantive policy
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control the justice's voting behavior" (Spaeth and Teger
1984, 295).
Judges' decisions seem primarily rooted in their own
prejudices, and so do the criticisms of the use of judicial
review.

Melone and Mace argue in their article, "Judicial

Review:

The Usurpation and Democracy Questions," that

"positions on judicial activism versus restraint often turn
on whose ox is being gored.

Yesterday's liberals often

criticized the Court for its activism; today it is the
conservatives who condemn the Court for the same sin" (Mace
and Melone 1988, 78).

"Whenever the Supreme Court renders a

decision that someone doesn't like, apparently it is not
enough to disagree with the decision; there also has to be
an accusation that the Court's decision was illegitimate,
being based upon the justice's personal views and not the
words of the Constitution or the intent of the framers"
(Shaman 1992, 37).

To disagree with the Court's opinion

does not somehow invalidate its role as interpreter of the
Constitution.

No American agrees with every law ever passed

by Congress, yet we abide by the laws because the process
has been accepted as legitimate.

Let the same now hold true

for the judiciary.

The Future of the Ninth Amendment

The Ninth Amendment is in its infancy in constitutional
interpretation and adjudication.

The future of the clause
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is uncertain as commentators debate about its true meaning,
and about the role it should play in our system.

Is the

Ninth Amendment a mere ghost ship, a wayward clause that has
no substance?

Or is it, as Randy Barnett believes, a

lifeboat? Barnett's analogy compares the Constitution to a
majestic ship, designed never to sink.

The designers expect

that it will stay afloat forever, but they add lifeboats
anyway, even though the designers hope they will never be
needed.

After many generations on this ship, the passengers

forget what many of the devices on this ship are, including
the lifeboats.

Suppose, then, that some crisis occurs, and

the boat begins to sink.

As Barnett asked, "Would it make

any sense to argue that passengers should refuse the
lifeboats or life preservers because it was 'never intended'
that they use them?" (Barnett 1989, 27-8).
would not.

Of course, it

As the Ninth Amendment becomes more recognized,

the Amendment, and the rights it protects, should be taken
seriously enough to break out the life preservers.

The

individual rights of Americans need not go down with the
ship.
Despite its lack of protection for the states, the
Ninth Amendment can still be a powerful tool to secure
liberty.

The Federalists and Anti-Federalists were both

insightful in their arguments concerning a bill of rights.
The Bill of Rights has been a great bulwark against
government invasion into private rights, and thus the

Anti-Federalists are vindicated.

But the Federalists were

also proven right, albeit mournfully so, that the listing of
certain rights for protection is a dangerous enterprise.
The Ninth Amendment is the key to capturing the best of both
worlds:

a declaration of rights with the guarantee that

there are other rights deserving of protection besides the
few mentioned.

We cannot ignore the obvious text of the

Ninth Amendment, for, as Dworkin notes, "The idea that the
Constitution cannot mean what it says ends in the unwelcome
conclusion that it means nothing at all" (Dworkin 1992,
392).

The Supreme Court stated in the Richmond Newspapers,

Inc. v. Virginia opinion,
The concerns expressed by Madison and others have
thus been resolved; the fundamental rights, even
though not expressly guaranteed, have been
recognized by the court as indispensable to the
enjoyment of rights explicitly defined (Richmond
580) .
Perhaps this declaration was a bit premature, but, except
for the states' rights argument, the possibility for
reconciling this two hundred year old debate about the best
method to protect individual rights lies as near as full
recognition of the role of the Ninth Amendment.
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